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Abstract
This paper considers labour supply and demand shocks in a simple flow model of the labour
market. We consider the propagation of these shocks in a matching model with competition
between various groups of job seekers. By way of simulations we explore the extent of labour
market hysteresis arising from competition between unemployed job seekers and job seekers
outside the labour force. The simulation model is based on an estimated aggregate matching
function. We find that the extent of hysteresis depends very much on the way labour demand
reacts to labour supply. Competition from non-participants in the search for jobs softens the
impact of demand shocks upon the unemployed.
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11. Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s The Netherlands, like most other European countries, witnessed a
dramatic rise in the unemployment rate (see Figure 1 below). This rise was characterised by a
number of upward jumps; steady state unemployment seemed to move to a higher level after
each cyclical downturn (see e.g. Bean (1994)). This pattern in unemployment rates suggests
unemployment persistence in the Netherlands (see e.g. Hartog and Theeuwes (1993), Graafland
(1988)).
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Due to shocks to labour supply and demand, unemployment may deviate from its long-rum
equilibrium. Several factors may prevent a quick return to its long-run equilibrium: adjustment
costs, wage-price staggering effects, insider-outsider effects, hazardous welfare state dynamics
and a loss of skills in unemployment (see e.g. Bean (1994), Lindbeck (1995), Snower (1997)).
Broersma, Koeman and Teulings (2000) find that for the Netherlands the most realistic scenario
is that a combination of hazardous welfare state dynamics and oil price shocks in the 1970s
caused high and persistent unemployment throughout the 1980s.
2This paper examines increased competition for jobs as a possible cause of unemployment
persistence, which seems particularly relevant for The Netherlands since the mid 1980s. In
particular we investigate the labour market dynamics after a labour supply or demand shock
when two types of unemployed workers, receiving unemployment insurance benefits or welfare,
must compete for jobs with job seekers outside the labour force. We label these job seekers
outside the labour force ‘non-participants’.
The increased supply of non-participants might be due to a shift in social patterns, which
induced more women to seek employment on the regular labour market. An other important
factor is related to the “entitlement effect of social security”. In the seventies the social security
system in The Netherlands became increasingly generous. As a result more persons from the
working age population learned how to become eligible for social security provisions.
Estimation of the entitlement effect as a residual trend in social security provisions which can
not be explained by demand (see Den Butter (1993)) shows that it may have led to an
autonomous increase in social security provisions of about 300 000 labour years.
In this paper we consider how increased competition from non-participants affects a stylised
model of the Dutch labour market. Specifically, we consider the persistence of unemployment
deviations from its long-run equilibrium in a simple empirical equilibrium flow model of the
labour market. We estimate the technology parameters of the matching function and consider
whether increased competition for jobs arising form non-participants is a plausible explanation
for unemployment persistence in the Netherlands.
The paper has the following outline. In section 2 we discuss related literature. In section 3 we
present the estimation results for the matching function with different types of job seekers.
Section 4 gives the model structure and its calibration. Section 5 contains the results of the
various simulation analyses and section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
For the individual who is engaged in job search the matching probability depends on two sets of
factors (Layard et al. (1991)). The first set consists of individual factors, like the reservation
wage. Furthermore, there are a number of personal characteristics that determine the matching
probability, such as the skill level and the individual search effort. The second set of factors that
3affect the individual matching probability is the number of vacancies and the degree of
competition for these vacancies from other job seekers.
Layard et al. (1991) only consider competition from other unemployed job seekers. All else
equal, a higher unemployment rate reduces the matching probability for the individual. But
obviously job competition for the unemployed can arise from any other groups in the labour
market: employed, (partially) disabled and workers outside the labour force, such as school-
leavers or women re-entering the labour market.
Burgess (1993) explores empirically the competition between unemployed and employed
workers. In his model the number of employed workers that engage in job search is
endogenously determined and positively related to the hiring rate. If more jobs become
available, on-the-job search increases and employed job seekers crowd out unemployed job
seekers. He finds that competition between employed and unemployed job seekers is a crucial
determinant for the overall outflow rate in the British labour market. Broersma (1997) replicates
Burgess’ study for the Dutch labour market and also finds that job competition between
employed and unemployed job seekers is an important phenomenon. Van Ours (1995) adds to
these findings that this competition is introduced by employers who use different recruitment
channels for the same vacancy. Most of the vacancies are posted through multiple channels.
Den Butter and Gorter (1999) introduce competition between employed and unemployed
workers in a stock-flow model. Their model is an empirical implementation of Pissarides’
(1994) equilibrium search model with on-the-job search, which analyses labour market policies
with heterogeneous jobs and endogenous job creation. Employed job seekers with bad jobs
compete with long-term and short-term unemployed workers for filling the vacancies for good
jobs.
It is important to take into account also non-unemployed job seekers not only for (policy)
analysis in simulation models of the labour market, but also for estimation of the parameters in
aggregate matching functions. Broersma and Van Ours (1999) show that the estimated matching
elasticity with respect to the number of job seekers in the aggregate matching function is biased
downward if only unemployed job seekers are taken into account. They use a single, rough
approximation of all non-unemployed job seekers and estimate an aggregate matching function.
Furthermore they stress that it is important to specify a matching function in which the measure
of job matches corresponds to the measure of job seekers. This is confirmed by Lindeboom and
4Van Ours (1993) who find different matching technologies for labour markets disaggregated by
education, occupation and region. They conclude that ‘changes in the aggregate level may
reflect changes in the composition of the labour market instead of changes in the matching
technology.’.
Blanchard and Diamond (1990) estimate a matching function relating a measure of hires to the
total stock of job seekers and vacancies. The total stock of job seekers includes unemployed,
non-participants and workers searching on-the-job. Blanchard and Diamond use an inconsistent
stock-flow measure because they have no data on the stock of job seekers from non-
participation and employment. However, they are able to provide some evidence that ranking of
unemployed over non-participants is present.
Mumford and Smith (1999) go one step further and present estimates of outflow equations for
employed, unemployed and job seekers outside the labour force. Contrary to Blanchard and
Diamond (1990) they have a data set where stocks and flows correspond to the same group of
job seekers. They reject the hypothesis that the three groups are perfect substitutes in the
matching process, i.e. that there is random hiring, instead their analysis provides evidence of
competition among the three groups of job seekers. Because the results differ among the three
outflow equations, Mumford and Smith are not able to draw strong conclusions on the relative
matching efficiency, or, in their interpretation, the order of ranking of job seekers by employers.
3. The model
Our model extends the literature in two directions. First we present a small stock-flow model of
the Dutch labour market in which we introduce competition for jobs between different types of
job seekers. We use estimated values of a matching function to calibrate the base-line
simulations for the model. This matching function forms the supply side of our model. It
constitutes the second innovation as we go one step further in differentiating the matching
function (cf. Mumford and Smith (1999)). We estimate an aggregate matching function
including three groups of job seekers in the labour market: unemployed receiving
unemployment insurance benefits, unemployed receiving welfare benefits and a stock of non-
participants that actively search for a job. On the demand side of the model we have firms that
post vacancies. The speed at which demand and supply come together is determined by an
aggregate matching function. The rate at which job-worker matches dissolve is fixed. Jobs in the
5labour market can be either filled and producing (E) or vacant and searching (V). The
distribution of workers and jobs over the different states depends on the flows between them.
The three flow rates into employment are determined endogenously by the matching function,
all other flow rates are exogenous in the model.
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Figure 2 shows the stocks and flows in the model. The dashed lines represent the endogenous
flows, the solid lines represent the exogenous flows. In the next section we use this model to
analyse job competition between long-term and short-term unemployed and job seekers from
outside the labour market and we analyse the impact of competition on labour market dynamics
due to labour demand and supply shocks.
Individuals in the working age population can be in one of four states on the labour market:
employment (E) unemployment and receiving insurance benefits (UI), unemployment and
receiving welfare benefits (WB) and non-participation (N). Unemployed workers entitled to
unemployment benefits (i.e. unemployment insurance) are unemployed workers with a recent
history of labour force attachment and can be considered short-term unemployed. After six to
forty-eight months, depending on the individual’s job history, entitlement to unemployment
6benefits expires. Subsequently, unemployed workers receive welfare benefits. Therefore welfare
recipients can be considered long-term unemployed.
The aggregate number of matches is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function. The matching
function can be viewed as a neo-classical production function that relates the number of matches
(output) to the number of effective job-seekers and vacancies (inputs). We impose constant-
returns-to-scale, which is typically not rejected in empirical work on the Dutch labour market
(see e.g. Broersma and Van Ours (1999)). The standard matching function reads
 [1] ( )( )αα −= 1ScVM ,
where M is the total number of job matches consisting of matches form the three groups, so M =
Mui + Mwb + Mn. V is the total stock of vacancies, c denotes the efficiency of the matching
process and α denotes the impact of vacancies in the matching process. S is the total number of
effective search units, with NWBUIS nwbui θθθ ++= , where θ represents the effective number
of search units of unemployed receiving unemployment benefits or welfare, and non-
participants. Typically one would want to estimate different values of search efficiency of each
of the three groups, but this would not be identified. Therefore we can not distinguish between
the effective number of search units and the matching efficiency the three groups of job seekers.
Therefore we assume that all three types of job seekers have the same matching efficiency c. If
we normalise the effective number of search units for unemployed receiving unemployment
benefits seeking for a job to one, we can estimate
[2] ( ) ( )( ) inwb NWBUIVcM εθθ αα +⋅+⋅+⋅⋅= −1expexp .
We estimate this relationship using annual data. Job matching from unemployed workers
receiving unemployment benefits is obtained from administrative data sources from the Dutch
National Institute for Social Security (LISV). Time series of matching from short-term
unemployment, disability and out of the labour force are constructed using a national accounting
method which is described in Kock (1998) and based on Broersma, Den Butter and Kock
(2000). The appendix provides further details. In the estimation procedure we correct for first
order auto-regression. The estimation results are given in Table 1.
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with unemployed workers receiving unemployment benefits or
welfare and non-participants
c α D wb D n AR(I)
Coefficient 1.94 0.23 -1.10 -2.98 0.57
(4.78) (4.54) (-2.31) (-8.41) (2.80)
# observations: 27 R2: 0.96
Durbin-
Watson: 1.84
Estimation method: non-linear iterative estimation
Hence the estimated matching function can be written as
[3] ( ) 77.023.0 05.033.094.1 NWBUIVM ⋅+⋅+⋅= .
Having discussed the endogenous flows in our model of the labour market we complete the
model by considering the relation between the stocks and flows. The stock of workers receiving
unemployment insurance benefits evolves according to the law of motion
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where the latter part represents the endogenously determined number of matches of workers
receiving unemployment insurance benefits. The matches are determined by the efficiency
parameter of the matching process c, labour market tightness V/S, the elasticity of matching α
and the umber of unemployed job seekers receiving unemployment insurance benefits. UIE→pi
is the flow rate form employment into unemployment and WBUI →pi  is the outflow rate from the
stock of workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits (i.e. short term unemployed) to the
stock of workers receiving welfare benefits (i.e. long term unemployed).
8Long-term unemployment evolves according to the law of motion
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where the latter part represents the endogenously determined number of matches of workers
receiving welfare benefits. E wb represents the share of unemployed workers receiving welfare
benefits that searchers for a job, so E wbWB is the effective number of search units in the stock of
welfare benefit recipients. WBN →pi  and WBUI →pi  are the flow rates form non-participation and
unemployed workers receiving insurance benefits into the stock of unemployed receiving
welfare benefits, respectively. NWB→pi  is the outflow rate from the stock of workers receiving
welfare benefits to the stock of non-participation.
Employment evolves according to the law of motion
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where S is the total number of effective search units, NWBUIS nwbui θθθ ++= . NE→pi  and
UIE→pi  are the flow rates from employment into the stock of non-participants and the stock of
workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits.
Non-participation evolves according to the law of motion
[7] 1
1
1
1111 −
−
−
−→−→−→− ⋅



⋅−⋅−⋅+⋅+= tn
t
t
tWBNtNWBtNEtt NS
V
cNWBENN θpipipi
α
where the latter part represents the endogenously determined number of matches of workers
receiving welfare benefits. E n represents the share of non-participants that searchers for a job, so
E nN is the effective number of search units in the stock of non-participants. NE→pi  and NWB→pi
are the flow rates form employed workers and workers welfare benefits into the stock of non-
participants, respectively. WBN →pi  is the outflow rate from the stock of non-participants to the
stock of workers receiving welfare benefits.
9We impose a steady state on the model. This implies some restrictions on the parameters. The
efficiency parameter c in the matching function and the elasticity of matching α were set in
accordance with the estimation results obtained in the previous paragraph, so c = 1.94 and α =
0.33. We set the search efficiency of individuals in welfare benefits and non-participants in
accordance with the estimation results, F wb = 0.33 and F n = 0.05. Given these parameters and
the average values of the stocks, we have the flows into employment. Given the data on the flow
from the stock of unemployed workers receiving insurance benefits (UI) to the stock of
unemployed workers receiving welfare benefits (WB), we derive the flow rate from employment
to UI ( UIE→pi ) using the steady state condition for the latter stock. Given this flow rate we can
determine the flow rate form employment to non-participation (N) from the steady state
condition for employment. Finally, using data for the flow rate form non-participation ( WBN →pi )
we can derive the flow rate from to the stock of workers receiving welfare benefits to non-
participation ( NWB→pi ) from the steady state condition of either N or WB (the system is linearly
dependent).
4. Simulation analysis
In this section we consider how the stock of unemployed workers (receiving unemployment
insurance benefits or welfare benefits), the stock of employed workers and the stock of workers
outside the labour force evolve after a shock to labour supply and demand.
We examine two types of labour supply shocks. One where we shock labour supply by
assuming that more (positive shock) or less (negative shock) workers outside the labour force
start searching for a job and that they register as unemployed. In another simulation we assume
that non-participants who do not find a job do not register as unemployed but stay outside the
labour force. This simulation illustrates an increase in job competition for unemployed workers
arising form increased labour supply form workers outside the labour force, arising from a the
shift in social pattern mentioned in the introduction, that induced women to seek employment
on the regular labour market. The ‘entitlement effect of social security’ is illustrated by
simulations where unmatched job seekers form non-participation register as unemployed and
become entitled to welfare benefits.
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In both sets of supply simulations we distinguish two types of labour market regimes. In the first
type we assume that the number of job slots is fixed (‘lump-of-labour-fallacy’), i.e. the change
in labour supply does not induce a response in labour demand. Specifically, we assume that
inflow of vacancies is independent of the number of effective job-seekers (V*). We model this as
a fixed inflow in the number of vacancies which is set equal to the exogenous outflow from
employment (i.e. a world with a fixed number of job slots).  In the second labour market regime
we assume that the ratio of vacancies over the number of effective job seekers remains
unchanged after a labour supply shock (in line with search theory, see e.g. Pissarides (1990,
Chapter 3)). In response to a positive (negative) shock to labour supply vacancies jump above
(below) their steady-state level. In these simulations we assume that the number of vacancies in
the market is given by
( )∗∗∗∗ −−−+++= NWBUINWBUIVV nwbtntwbtt θθθθξ
where V*, UI*, θwbWB* and θnN* denote the number of vacancies, the number of unemployed
receiving insurance benefits, the effective number of unemployed receiving welfare benefits and
the effective number of non-participants searching for a job in the steady-state equilibrium,
respectively. ξ denotes a positive parameter, and set at the ratio between vacancies and the
effective supply of labour in the steady-state.
When we perform simulations with a labour demand shock we distinguish a labour market
where non-participants are searching for a job and one where only unemployed who receive
welfare benefits or insurance benefits are engaged in job search, in order to see how competition
form new entrants affects the impulse response functions. All adjustment paths are presented as
deviations form the steady state base-line simulation.
Figure 3 and 4 present the results of shocks to labour supply where the shock is modelled as a
temporary change in the flow from non-participation to the stock of unemployed workers
receiving welfare benefits, WBN →pi , for the ‘lump-of-labour’ fallacy regime and the labour
market with vacancy adjustment, respectively. We impose a 10 percent shock (equals 18.17
thousand persons) in the first 12 months of the simulation. When the labour supply shock is
modelled as a change in WBN →pi  unmatched additional labour supply joins the unemployment
pool.
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The first thing to note from Figure 3 and 4 is that unemployment changes in response to the
increased inflow. Indeed, in the case of a constant ratio V/S (Figure 3b), even though vacancies
rise in proportion with the increase in the number of effective job seekers, unemployment stays
above its equilibrium level for quite some time. The matching technology accommodates only
part of the shock in a given period. The increased inflow pushes unemployment above its
equilibrium level. Consequently, the share of long-term unemployed individuals increases,
reducing the effective supply of labour at given unemployment. This hampers the ability of the
matching process to equilibrate the market.
Note form Figure 3 and 4 that the impact of a positive and negative shock to the inflow into
unemployment on unemployment is symmetric in both labour market regimes..
In the case of a fixed number of job slots, the ‘lump-of-labour’ fallacy, the simulation with a
positive shock may represent the entitlement effect of social security where the increase in
labour supply does not alter the costs of opening a vacancy and therefore does not affect labour
demand. This would be the case if the positive effect of the increased generosity of social
security on wages and the negative effect of increased labour supply on the search costs for
employers cancel out. Once again we note that unemployment changes in response to the
change in the inflow into unemployment.
In the second set of simulations we examine a shock to the number of non-participants that offer
their labour, where unmatched non-participants do not flow into unemployment but remain in
the state of non-participation. When the labour supply shock is modelled as a change in  nN
unmatched additional labour supply remains in the state of non-participation. Simulation results
are given in Figure 5 (positive shock) and 6 (negative shock).
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Changes in the number of non-participants that offer their labour do affect unemployment when
the stock of vacancies, is fixed (Figure 5a and 6a). Indeed, an unchanged stock of jobs has to be
divided among more candidates, in case of a positive shock. Unemployment eventually returns
to its equilibrium level. After the shock the number of matches is above its equilibrium level as
long as the inputs (unemployment) in the matching function are above their equilibrium level,
pushing unemployment down. The unemployed temporarily face more competition from non-
participants, whereas the inflow of vacancies is fixed.
If labour demand does adjust (Figure 5b), the stock of vacancies will be below its equilibrium
level after the shock has ended, pushing unemployment further away from its equilibrium level.
However, there is a steady inflow of new vacancies. Hence, the stock of vacancies eventually
recovers after the initial shock, and so does the outflow from unemployment (in our model there
is only one equilibrium level of unemployment). When labour demand adjusts after a shock, the
number of matches deviates more from its steady state equilibrium than when the lump-of-
labour fallacy applies. However, adjustment after the shock is faster.
Furthermore, note that impact of either shock on unemployment is limited when unmatched
non-participants do not join the unemployment pool. Hence, if a labour supply shock is to have
a large effect on unemployment, the additional labour supply has to be counted as unemployed.
Finally, note that the impact of positive and negative shocks on unemployment is virtually
identical.
From the supply shock simulations we conclude that the impact of labour supply shocks
depends negatively on the flexibility of labour demand, in a sense that adjustment is takes place
faster. The impact on unemployment is most pronounced when the unabsorbed change in labour
supply joins the unemployment pool.
Finally, we consider the effect of labour demand shocks on competition between unemployed
and non-participants. We implement labour demand shocks as a temporary change in the stock
of vacancies in the market. Specifically, the number of vacancies increases (decreases) by 50
per cent during the first year of the simulation. Simulation results are given in Figure 7 and 8
respectively. We consider the impact of changes in the number of vacancies on unemployment
in the presence (Figure 7a and 8a) and absence (Figure 7b and 8b) of competition from non-
participants.
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From Figure 7 and 8 we observe that the presence of competing non-participants reduces the
responsiveness of unemployment to shocks to labour demand, i.e. changes in vacancies. Positive
shocks to labour demand are partly absorbed by non-participants, reducing the number of
additional job slots available for unemployed job seekers. Negative shocks to labour demand are
partly absorbed by non-participants, once again softening the impact on unemployment.
Furthermore, we observe that the impact of demand shocks on unemployment is asymmetric.
Negative shocks raise unemployment by more than positive negative shocks reduce it (due to
the diminishing returns to the inputs in the aggregate matching function).
5. Conclusions
In this paper we consider labour supply and demand shocks in a simple reduced-form flow
model of the labour market. We estimate an empirical matching function including different
groups of job seekers and developed an equilibrium flow model of the Dutch labour market. The
model simulations investigate the extent of labour market hysteresis which can be attributed to
competition between unemployed and non-participants in the labour market.
Since the beginning of the 1980 the Dutch labour market faces persistent unemployment. A
number of explanations have been suggested for this, but a combination of hazardous welfare
state dynamics and oil price shocks in the 1970s seems a valid explanation (Broersma et al.
(2000).
In our simulations we find that competition from non-participants in search for jobs softens the
impact of demand and supply shocks upon unemployment, although it takes longer before the
economy returns to its long run equilibrium. When we model the shock of labour supply as a
change in the number of non-participants, i.e. they are not registered as unemployed and
therefore do not flow into unemployment, the effect on unemployment is limited. Indeed, when
the ratio between vacancies and the effective supply of labour does not change in response to
the shock, the effect on unemployment is virtually zero.
Another important issue is whether or net labour demand adjusts to changes in the supply of
labour, i.e. does the ‘lump-of-labour’ fallacy apply? In simulations of the Dutch Central
Planning Bureau a 1 percent increase in the supply of labour after 10 years generates an increase
in employment of about 0.4 percent. Broersma et al. (1997) reject this ‘lump-of-labour’
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proposition and estimate a VAR model for the Dutch labour market to prove their point.
They find that a 1 percent increase in the supply of labour is almost fully absorbed by
employment after 10 years (0.94 percent increase).
Our results indicate that adjustment is even quicker, as we find that the impact on
unemployment of a 10 percent shock to labour supply, i.e. the number of non-participants that
searches for a job, has almost completely vanished after 5 years. In our simulation analysis we
find that the impact on unemployment is larger if the number of vacancies does not respond to
the change in the supply of labour.
21
Data Sources and Description
All numbers x 1000.
UI Stock of unemployed receiving insurance benefits, excluding civil-servants and
self-employed. About 70 percent of the working population is covered by
unemployment insurance (WW). Source: CTSV (1998, Table 6.6 and 6.2) and own
calculations.
WB Stock of unemployed receiving welfare benefits. Source: CTSV (1998, Table 2.1)
and Kock (1998).
E Employed workers (employees and self-employed) with a regular job of 12 hours a
week or more. Source: CPB.
N Non-participants (above age 14). Source: CBS, Bevolkingsstatistiek.
V Vacancies. Source: CBS, Sociaal Economische Maandstatistiek and Muysken et al.
(1991).
WBUI →pi Flow from UI to WB. We use data that represent unemployed receiving
unemployment insurance benefits who are no longer entitled to these benefits
because they have reached the maximum term. Outflow due to reaching the
maximum term can also take place to non-participation, but we make the
reasonable assumption that these people continue to be part of the labour market
and all flow into welfare. Source: LISV (1998, Table 6.2).
WBN →pi Flow from non-participation to unemployed receiving welfare benefits. Source:
Kock (1998).
UIM Job matching from the stock of unemployed receiving insurance benefits. Source:
LISV (1998).
22
lUM Job matching from the stock of unemployed receiving welfare benefits. Sources:
Kock (1998).
NM Job matching of workers from outside the labour force. Source: Kock (1998).
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